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Measuring global bystander intervention and
exploring its antecedents for helping refugees
Nihan Albayrak-Aydemir* and Ilka Helene Gleibs
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Although the bystander intervention model provides a useful account of how people help
others,nopreviousstudyhasapplied it toaglobalemergency.Thisresearchaimstodevelopa
scale formeasuring global bystander intervention and investigate its potential antecedents in
theSyrianrefugeeemergency. InStudy1(N = 80)andStudy2(N = 205), a12-itemscalewas
established through a substantive-validity assessment and a confirmatory factor analysis,
respectively. Study 3 (N = 601) explored the potential antecedents of the global bystander
intervention, employing British andGerman samples. Results show that the global bystander
intervention model worked for both samples, but there were significant between-group
differences in terms of the extent to which they notice the emergency, know how to help,
show political support, and donate money. Overall, the visibility of the global emergency
aftermaths within the context has been deduced as a meaningful driver for between-group
differences. This research provides the first empirical evidence on global bystander
interventionand itoffers timelysuggestions topromotesupport for refugeesorothervictims
of global disasters, especially among those who are distant to the disaster zone.
BACKGROUND
We see news of global emergencies almost every day, often driven by violence, natural
disasters, poverty, or displacement. The countrieswhere these emergencies takeplace often
do not have enough resources to offer solutions to the aforementioned problems (United
Nations, 2019), and thus, the assistance of other countries that can alleviate the suffering
caused by such emergencies is essential. Yet, governmental helping responses are primarily
shaped by political interests instead of needs (Mahendran, 2017), thus placing particular
significancetoindividualpeople’shelpingresponses.There isalsoa lackof responsetoglobal
emergenciesbypeoplewholive incountries thataregeographicallydistant fromwhere these
emergencies took place (Pittinsky&Diamante, 2015). Therefore, it is of great importance to
research individual helping responses to such disasters frompeoplewho live geographically
further away, especially through twokeyquestions:Howdoes thehelpingprocess takeplace
in global emergencies and what factors may be associated with such helping? This research
will attempt to answer these questions in the light of the bystander intervention model. In
doing so, it will focus on the Syrian refugee emergency, which is one of themost prominent
global emergenciesnowadayswith thebiggestdisplacedpopulationreported todate. Syrians
began to leave their homeland in 2011 due to an ascending civil conflict, and since then, the
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number of Syrians seeking shelter in another country increases every year (United Nations
HighCommissioner forRefugees, 2019).Wespecifically select the Syrian refugeeemergency
as the context for this research, mainly because this emergency, as well as its effects, have
lasted and are likely to last for a long time, not only affecting Syrians but also other
communities involved. Therefore, exploring the helping parameters of such an emergency
would be beneficial for a variety of populations in addition to contributing to current
psychological research.
Bystander intervention in global emergencies
To understandwhat leads to bystander intervention, Latane andDarley (1970) proposed a
cognitive model of helping by conducting a series of laboratory experiments where they
created artificial emergencies to test individuals’ responses to a variety of events. Their
approach produced the well-known model (Burn, 2009) and the primary organizing
structure (Banyard, 2011) for interpreting bystander intervention. In this model, they
identified five sequential steps that determinewhether individuals intervene in a situation
that requires their help: (1) noticing the event, (2) interpreting the event as an emergency,
(3) taking responsibility to help, (4) knowing how tohelp, and (5) applying the decision to
help. They further suggested that failure to take one of these steps results in bystander
non-intervention.
The bystander intervention model has been applied to numerous contexts (e.g.,
computer-mediated communication, Markey, 2000; bullying and sexual harassment,
Nickerson et al., 2014; child abuse and domestic violence, Hoefnagels & Zwikker, 2001),
revealing the effectiveness of this model across different settings. Research so far
conducted on this model has tested it exclusively in real or imagined concrete settings
where individuals are direct witnesses of a single emergency (e.g., Banyard et al., 2019;
Jenkins et al., 2018; Leone et al., 2017; Levine & Crowther, 2008). However, especially in
recent times, people have been indirectly witnessing many global emergencies around
the world that they do not necessarily have any physical connection with. There may be
numerous global bystanders from various countries all over the world, who cannot
directly witness the sufferings of victims in such emergencies but whose help to these
victims might be critical.
In effect, Pittinsky and Diamente (2015) propose the concept of the global bystander
(non)intervention and elaborately theorize how each step of the bystander intervention
model can be applied to global emergencies, by also commenting on relevant factors for
each step. To date, however, no scale exists to measure global bystander intervention.
Hence, this research makes two key contributions. First, it constructs a scale to measure
how individuals perceive and act upon global emergencies based on the bystander
intervention model. Then, using this scale, it empirically tests the effectiveness of the
global bystander intervention model in a real and ongoing emergency.
Applying the bystander intervention model into the global context
Rabow et al. (1990) convincingly argue that the bystander intervention model does not
necessarily support the notion that bystanders are conscious of their decision-making
process of helping or that these decisions are the only decisions bystanders make for
intervening in an emergency. A great number of factors are also documented to affect each
of the steps in thismodel. It is, therefore, necessary to understandwhat kind of factors can
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contribute to these steps in the distinctive context of global emergencies, considering
previously identified factors from past research.
Noticing the event (NOTICE)
Individuals first must notice an event, for which a shift of attention to an atypical situation
is needed. Bystander intervention in a situation is directly or indirectly predicted by the
bystanders’ perception of the situation (Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Rabow et al., 1990).
Individuals are less likely to pay attention to an event that requires their help if there is a
focus on the self or a distraction from the environment (Burn, 2009).On the contrary, they
becomemore likely to spot emergencies if these situations appear as vivid events (Dovidio
et al., 2006), are clearly dangerous and not ambiguous (Fischer et al., 2006), or involve
readily identified victims (Small & Loewenstein, 2003). These factors may, however, be
stable in the context of global emergencies because such emergencies are usually
characterized as being ambiguous with no specifically identified victims and particular
events. In this case, itmay bemore beneficial to focus onother factors, such as the salience
or visibility of victims. Past research shows that a lack of salience may result in less aid
(Fischer et al., 2011). Even the type of salience may be important as both seeing an
emergency and hearing about it trigger more helping responses than just hearing about it
(Solomon et al., 1978). Furthermore, global emergencies can be more conveniently
spotted via media or social media channels thanks to the increasing social network
penetration rates (Statista, 2019). In that sense, the salience of victims in media or social
media outlets might also contribute to the extent individuals notice an emergency. Thus,
we expect that salience (or visibility) of victims will positively connect to how frequently
people notice a global situation (H1).
Interpreting the event as an emergency (EMERGENCY)
After noticing an event, individualsmust interpret it as an emergency that requires others’
assistance. To what degree people believe the existence of an emergency happening
might influence their interpretation of the situation (Hoefnagels & Zwikker, 2001).
Bystanders might not see significant events as emergencies due to the ambiguity or
misunderstanding of the situation (e.g., considering the perpetrator of a sexual
harassment event as the romantic partner) (Shotland & Straw, 1976; Solomon et al.,
1978). If there is ambiguity, people may want to interpret the situation based on the
responses of those who are in the vicinity of the emergency. This can, then, lead to
pluralistic ignorance, which is a collective failure to see the situation as an emergency due
to a misinterpretation based on other people’s responses (Darley & Latane, 1968). Global
emergencies can be considered highly ambiguous due to their complex nature andpeople
become more influenced by others’ reactions in such circumstances (Bickman &
Rosenbaum, 1977). Individuals might not recognize an emergency as well as the need for
immediate help if those around them are not certain about the emergency or not helping
victims. Therefore, we suggest that pluralistic ignorance will negatively relate to how
much people recognize a global situation as an emergency (H2a). Besides, the perceived
continuity of an emergency can be another important factor contributing to how people
interpret a global situation. If there is an ongoing situation that has continued and is likely
to continue for a long time, people may recognize it as an unfortunate but chronic
condition, rather than an emergency requiring their urgent aid (Pittinsky & Diamante,
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2015). Thus, we expect that the perceived continuity of an emergency will negatively
correlate with how much people recognize a global situation as an emergency (H2b).
Taking responsibility to help (RESPONSIBILITY)
After recognizing a situation as an emergency, individuals must feel responsible to aid.
Various factors can affect the extent to which people feel responsible for helping,
including bystander characteristics, victim characteristics, situational characteristics, and
the relationship between bystanders and victims (Hoefnagels & Zwikker, 2001). Identity
relations can be especially relevant in global emergencies. Individuals are more likely to
take responsibility for helping when targets are their ingroup members (Levine et al.,
2002),when they have an increased sense of self-other overlapwith targets (Cialdini et al.,
1997), or when they perceive targets as similar to themselves (Emswiller et al., 1971).
Since there is usually a physical distance between helpers and targets in global
emergencies, psychological proximity between help-givers and help-receivers deriving
from a shared-identity or similarity can play a key role. Consequently, we expect that how
much responsible people feel to help in a global emergency will positively relate to how
much they perceive victims as similar to themselves (H3).
Knowing how to help (KNOW)
After feeling responsible to intervene in an emergency, individualsmust know and decide
on how to provide help. At this point, a critical decision is beingmade aboutwhether help
will be implemented directly or indirectly (Hoefnagels & Zwikker, 2001). Absence of
intervention skills can engender a lack of knowledge on how to help in an emergency
(Burn, 2009; Cramer et al., 1988), and this may result in non-intervention. As there might
be variousways of helping in global emergencies (e.g., donating goods ormoney, showing
political support, involving in collective action, and volunteering), knowing how to help
effectively might be a pertinent dimension to consider. It can especially be harder to
distinguish effective ways of helping in global emergencies as there are usually plenty of
agencies or actors involved in the emergency as well as in the humanitarian processes.
Peoplemay not be sure that their helpwill fully reach victims ormay think that itwill serve
to wrong purposes, such as fraud (Pittinsky & Diamante, 2015). Hence, the more
individuals can identify ways of effective helping, the more easily they may know and
decide on how to provide help. We suggest that especially in global emergencies,
identifying effective ways of providing help will be positively correlated with how much
people know how to help (H4).
Applying the decision to help (ACT)
Once a decision about the delivery of help is taken, individuals explicitly perform the act
of helping. Although critical helping actions are usually not very complex or complicated
to be carried out, people might become nervous due to the stressing nature of an
emergency and this might turn a simple task to a difficult action to be performed
(Hoefnagels & Zwikker, 2001). Besides, there are many other factors, which may prevent
people from applying a decision to intervene. Latane and Darley (1970) unveil that
bystandersmay not apply their decision to intervene if they have social concerns, such as a
fear of embarrassment. This phenomenon, referred to audience inhibition, can even just
rely on indigenous norms and take place when these norms do not promote the required
4 Nihan Albayrak-Aydemir and Ilka Helene Gleibs
helping behaviours (Rutkowski et al., 1983). Especially in global emergencies that are
hard to truly interpret, people might be more affected by those around them and become
less likely to intervene if audience inhibition increases. Therefore, we suggest that
audience inhibition and how much people help in global emergencies will be negatively
correlated (H5a). Furthermore, people become less prone to help if they think that there
are more competent others to provide aid (Schwartz & Clausen, 1970). It is plausible for
people to think that individual help is inconsequential and other actors, such as
governmental or non-governmental institutions, are more capable to relieve the suffering
of victims in a global emergency. Hence, we also expect that feeling incompetent to help
will be negatively associated with how much people help in global emergencies (H5b).
The present research
The present research has two major aims. First, we construct a Global Bystander
Intervention Scale, and then, using this scale, we empirically test the stated hypotheses
above in two different contexts. To this end, we created several items and ran a
substantive-validity assessment to identify the most representative items for the first four
factors of the global bystander intervention model (Study 1), ran a confirmatory factor
analysis with the identified items and explored the relationships of themodel factors with
a relevant construct (Study 2), and ran amultigroup confirmatory factor analysis by testing
measurement invariances and explored the potential antecedents for each model factor
through a cross-country design with participants from the United Kingdom (UK) and
Germany to explore contextual differences (Study 3). An overview of the studies is
presented in Figure 1.We reported all measures and exclusions in this research. Analyses
were conducted in R version 3.6.3 (R Core Team, 2020).1 Materials, data, and analysis
codes necessary to replicate three studies can be reached through the Open Science
Framework (https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/GZ25S/).
Figure 1. An overview of the studies.
1Weused psych version 1.9.12 (Revelle, 2019), Rmisc version 1.5 (Hope, 2013), ltm version 0.7-0 (Rizopoulos, 2006), andMVN
version 1.6 (Korkmaz, Goksuluk, & Zararsiz, 2014) for descriptive analyses, and lavaan version 0.4-14 (Rosseel, 2012),
equaltestMI version 0.6.0 (Jiang & Mai, 2020), and lsr version 0.5 (Navarro, 2015) for CFA, SEM, and mean comparison
analyses.
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STUDY 1
This study aims to run a substantive-validity assessment (SVA)with the itemswecreated to
measure global bystander intervention for helping refugees. Substantive validity is a form
of content validity that helps to understand whether the content of an item truly
represents the intended construct (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991). It is essential before
developing a measure because it helps to eliminate the items that poorly represent their
intended constructs and choosing the items that best represent their theorized constructs
for a subsequent confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). In psychology, CFA is often seen as
appropriate to understand whether items are representative of intended constructs;
however, it only helps to determine whether certain items share enough variance to
create a single factor. Even if there is a shared variance, CFA does not provide enough
information to assume that items truly represent their suggested construct created by a
factor. SVA, on the other hand, is an assessment of the extent to which an item represents
its theorized construct. It ensures that items are clearly and correctly interpreted by both
experts and lay audiences. Thus, we wanted to run SVA to identify the items that would
best represent the four proposed factors of the bystander intervention model. We
intentionally excluded the fifth factor (ACT) as helping action might take different forms
based on individual characteristics and particular contexts, especially in the case of global
emergencies. Our primary purpose was to identify three items per factor that best
represent their intended constructs distinctively than other constructs.
Method
Participants
Only a small sample of 20 people is required for an SVA (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991). We
recruited 80 native English speakers online via Prolific (www.prolific.co), by quadrupling
the required sample size to carry out our analysis for four factors and paid them £0.85
(£5.10 per hour) for participating in the study. There was no exclusion. The mean age of
the sample was 38.53 (SD = 13.21), and the majority of the sample was female (66.25%),
British (86.25%), and without a religious affiliation (55%).
Measures and procedure
We used Anderson and Gerbing’s (1991) approach to SVA. In the light of the existing
literature on the bystander intervention model, the first author developed definitions for
each of the four factors of bystander intervention (i.e., NOTICE, EMERGENCY,
RESPONSIBILITY, and KNOW) and created 32 items (8 items per factor) based on these
definitions (Table A1 in Appendix). Then, the second author reviewed all definitions and
items, after which we made some adjustments to the items. Following this, two other
experts in the field were separately asked to review all definitions and items, by focusing
specifically on technical meaning and clarity. We incorporated their comments to create
the final versions of definitions and items.
After being informed about the nature of the study, participantswere asked to read the
definitions of the four factors. Theywere then asked to assign eachof the 32 items into one
of the four factors or an ‘unclassified’ category based on the factor definitions given. The
definitions were also presented at the top of the page during this task. Participants saw
each item one at a time and the order of the itemswas randomized to control for the order
effects.
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Results
SVA includes two indices of substantive validity: Proportion of substantive agreement
(Psa) and substantive-validity coefficient (Csv). The former displays the proportion of an
item that is assigned to its theorized construct (Psa = nc/N), with greater than .75 cut-off
point indicating a good score. The latter displays the extent towhich an item is assigned to
its theorized construct more than to any other construct (Csv = (nc–no)/N)2, with greater
than .50 cut-off point indicating a good score.
At first, we calculated Psa and Csv indices for each item and identified the three items
per factor that best represent their intended constructs (Table A2 in Appendix). After
identifying three items for each factor, we calculated average Psa and Csv scores for each
factor and overall average Psa and Csv scores for bystander intervention: first including all
items (Test 1) and then, including the twelve identified items only (Test 2). We aimed to
compare the substantive validity of all items with the identified twelve items only to test
whether the identified items have a better representation of their respective constructs
than all of the items.
As shown in Table 1, Test 1 results including all of the items display three of the four
factors (NOTICE, RESPONSIBILITY, KNOW) with an aggregated Psa greater than .75 cut-
off point while the remaining factor (EMERGENCY) falling below the threshold. Similarly,
they show only one of the four factors (RESPONSIBILITY) with an aggregated Csv greater
than .50 cut-off point while the remaining three factors (NOTICE, EMERGENCY, KNOW)
falling below the threshold. Test 2 results including the twelve identified items, on the
other hand, display all of the factors with an aggregated Psa greater than .75 and with an
aggregated Csv greater than .50. Taken altogether, these results indicate that item
reduction has improved the overall substantive validity and the identified twelve items
represent their intended constructs better than all of the items. This is further shown by
the totalCsv scores,which are .51 in Test 1 and .70 in Test 2. Hence, these results provided
a three-item solution for each of the four factors as planned.
STUDY 2
This study aims to a) validate the previously identified items as a scale through a CFA, b)
scrutinize the extent to which the steps of the global bystander intervention model are
Table 1. Average proportion of substantive agreement (Psa) and substantive-validity indices (Csv) before
and after item reductions in Study 1
Factors
Test 1 (before) Test 2 (after)
Number of Items Psa Csv Number of Items Psa Csv
NOTICE 8 .705 .488 3 .846 .738
EMERGENCY 8 .561 .347 3 .771 .663
RESPONSIBILITY 8 .805 .720 3 .829 .750
KNOW 8 .700 .498 3 .783 .663
Total/Average 32 .693 .513 12 .807 .703
2 nc represents the number of assignments of an item to the correct construct,N represents the number of participants, and no
represents the higher number of assignments of an item to an incorrect construct.
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associated with each other and a related construct, and c) examine the extent to which
each step in the global bystander intervention model predicts the subsequent step as in
the original bystander intervention model. We chose charitable donation for the
behavioural measure (ACT) for an initial analysis. Moreover, we wanted to test the
criterion validity by investigating how our measure relates to a different measure that
highly correlates with helping. For this, we preferred empathy to explore its relationships
with the model factors because of the robust connection evidenced between empathy
and helping by a plethora of research (e.g., Batson, 1991; Habashi et al., 2016; Pavey et al.,
2012).We approached it as feelings of concern for victims rather than a trait characteristic
as operationalized in past research (Batson et al., 1989; Toi & Batson, 1982).
Method
Participants
As a sample of 200 people or above is suggested for structural equation modelling (SEM)
analyses (Kline, 2011), we recruited 205 native English speakers online via Prolific (www.
prolific.co) and paid them £0.50 (£7.50 per hour) for participating in the study. Therewas
no exclusion. Themean age of the samplewas 34.77 (SD = 13.46), and themajority of the
sample was female (63.9%), British (68.8%), and without a religious affiliation (54.1%).
Measures and procedure
Participants responded to all measures on a 7-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 7:
strongly agree) unless noted otherwise. All items in each measure were randomized in
itself to eliminate the order effects. Twelve items thatwere identified in Study 1were used
to assess the four factors of the global bystander intervention model (NOTICE,
EMERGENCY, RESPONSIBILITY, KNOW). Five items adapted from James and Zagefka
(2017) were used to measure participants’ empathy felt for Syrian refugees (e.g., ‘I feel
great sympathy for Syrian refugees and their suffering.’). We used one question to assess
charitable donation as the fifth factor of the global bystander intervention model (ACT).
We gave participants an option to donate none, some, or all of the study participation
rewards they will receive (1: 0%, 11: 100%). Regardless of their response to this question,
they were debriefed and fully received their participation reward upon the completion of
the study.
Results
CFA of the model and correlations among model factors
We ran a CFA with the four factors of the global bystander intervention model. The data
included the previously identified twelve items for the global bystander intervention
model, three for each factor. We used NOTICE1,NOTICE2,NOTICE3 (items 1, 3, and 17
from Study 1, respectively) to measure NOTICE factor; EMERGENCY 1, EMERGENCY 2,
EMERGENCY3 (items8, 21, and24 fromStudy1, respectively) tomeasureEMERGENCY
factor; RESPONSIBILITY 1, RESPONSIBILITY 2, RESPONSIBILITY 3 (items 9, 12, and 26
from Study 1, respectively) to measure RESPONSIBILITY factor; and KNOW1, KNOW2,
KNOW3 (items 14, 16, and 31 from Study 1, respectively) to measure KNOW factor. All
items were treated as continuous variables in the analysis.
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Exploratory data analysis revealed deviations from normality in data distributions
(Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix). Therefore, we used maximum likelihood estimation
with test statistics using 1,000 bootstrapped samples and robust standard errors. All
parameters were freely estimated. The model fit3 was excellent (χ2 (48) = 95.00,
p < .001; CFI = .97; TLI = .96; RMSEA = .07; SRMR = .04), and as expected, all
indicators showed significantly positive factor loadings, with standardized coefficients
ranging from .64 to .95 (see Table 2 for all factor loadings; Figure A1 in Appendix).
Table 2. Contents of the selected items and their factor loadings to the respective model factors in









NOTICE 1: I am aware of the Syrian refugee issue
around the world.
.70*** .54*** .43***
NOTICE 2: I know that a lot of Syrians are forced to
leave their country each year to be able to continue
their lives.
.82*** .73*** .83***
NOTICE 3: I am aware that there is a war in Syria
causing many people to flee from their homeland.
.87*** .72*** .83***
EMERGENCY 1: It is evident to me that urgent
humanitarian aid is needed for the Syrian refugee
issue.
.91*** .87*** .79***
EMERGENCY 2: I think that the Syrian refugee issue is
a severe emergency that other people should be
involved.
.86*** .88*** .85***
EMERGENCY 3: I believe that the situation of Syrian
refugees is an emergency that requires the help of
other people.
.95*** .82*** .88***
RESPONSIBILITY 1: I feel personally responsible for
helping Syrian refugees to safely continue their lives.
.85*** .79*** .83***
RESPONSIBILITY 2: It is my duty to do something to
ease the pain and suffering of Syrian refugees.
.94*** .88*** .87***
RESPONSIBILITY 3: I believe that I have a
responsibility to help Syrian refugees because my
actions can comfort them.
.89*** .85*** .93***
KNOW1: I knowwhat to say to get others to help or
support Syrian refugees.
.70*** .65*** .61***
KNOW 2: I can find organizations that provide
support to Syrian refugees.
.64*** .61*** .57***
KNOW 3: I know a number of ways I can help Syrian
refugees.
.88*** .87*** .88***
Note. ***p < .001.
3 All model fits within CFA and SEM analyses in this paper were interpreted based on CFI, TLI, RMSEA, and SRMR scores, whose
threshold values indicate a good fit with 0.95, 0.95, 0.07, and 0.08 cut-off points, respectively (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Steiger,
2007).
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Then, to examine whether all of the items constitute one factor rather than four, the
twelve items were grouped as if predicted by one latent variable, which had a
significantly worse fit to the data than the original model (χ2 (6) = 525.14, p < .001).
Similarly, to examine whether NOTICE and EMERGENCY items constitute one factor
rather than two as these two factors are highly related based on initial CFA results
(r = .79), their six items were grouped as if predicted by one latent variable. This model
also had a significantly worse fit to the data than the original model (χ2 (3) = 93.03,
p < .001). Taken together, these results were consistent with the characterization of the
bystander intervention model.
Finally, we calculated means and standard deviations, run correlations with
computed mean scores, and checked for reliabilities (see Table 3). Internal consis-
tency coefficients for all of the four factors were above .77. There were also significant
positive correlations among four latent factors ranging from .23 (between EMER-
GENCY and KNOW) to .70 (between NOTICE and EMERGENCY), which indicates that
those who noticed the event were more likely to recognize it as an emergency, take
responsibility to help, and know how to help. However, charitable donation as the
fifth factor did not have a significant relationship with KNOW, whereas it significantly
and positively correlated with the other three factors, which signals a need to include
other measures to assess the fifth factor. Lastly, empathy significantly and positively
correlated with all factors, ranging from .19 (with KNOW) to .84 (with EMERGENCY),
displaying a good criterion validity.
SEM of the model
We tested the sequential steps of the model using SEM. The model provided an excellent
fit to the data (χ2 (56) = 105.65, p < .001; CFI = .97; TLI = .96; RMSEA = .07;
SRMR = .04). Each step significantly and positively predicted the subsequent step as
theorized in the bystander intervention model, except that KNOW negatively predicted
charitable donation (see Figure 2).
STUDY 3
This study aims to a) further test themeasure of global bystander interventionwith a cross-
country design and validate it again through a multigroup CFA by testing measurement
invariance in two different contexts, b) scrutinize the extent to which the steps of the
global bystander interventionmodel are associatedwith eachother, c) examine the extent
to which each step in the global bystander intervention model predicts the subsequent
step, and finally, d) explore the antecedents of each step of the global bystander
intervention model in two different countries. We specifically wanted to compare
samples from two different countries to explore whether the visibility of the global
emergency repercussions within the context makes a difference. To this end, we chose
Germany as the country for comparison to the UK because it has the highest number of
Syrian refugees in Europe (UnitedNationsHighCommissioner for Refugees, 2020),which
increases the visibility of second-hand effects of the global emergency for the German
people. Differently than Study 2, we used three different measures for the fifth step (ACT)
to explore differences in how help is provided in global emergencies.
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Method
Participants
In this study, wewanted to run a CFAwith a bigger sample than in Study 2, in linewith the
sample size suggestions from previous literature (Kline, 2011). We initially recruited 636
participants online via Prolific (www.prolific.co) and paid £0.50 (£6.00 per hour) for
participating in the study. Therewere two participant groups: British citizens living in the
UK and German citizens living in Germany. Eight participants (NBritish = 1, NGerman = 7)
were excluded because their nationality or the country of residence data did not fit their
respective target groups and 27 participants (NBritish = 12, NGerman = 15) were excluded
because they failed an attention check, which remained 601 participants in total. The
mean age of the British sample (N = 306)was 38.76 (SD = 11.91), and themajority of this
samplewas female (68.0%) andwithout a religious affiliation (51.6%). Themean age of the
German sample (N = 295) was 28.61 (SD = 8.32), and most of this sample was male
(61.4%) and without a religious affiliation (47.5%).
Measures and procedure
As in Study 2, all measureswere answered on a 7-point Likert scale unless noted otherwise
and all items in eachmeasurewere randomized.Weused severalmeasures to examine the
potential antecedents of the global bystander intervention model. Three items measured
how often the situation of victims are salient to participants (salience of victims; e.g., ‘In
my daily life, I see the situation of Syrian refugees.’; 1: never, 7: always; αBritish = .72,
rGerman = .79). Two items assessed the extent to which participants think those around
them negatively react to helping victims (pluralistic ignorance; e.g., ‘People around me
are not certain that Syrian refugees need help.’; rBritish = .54, rGerman = .60, p < .001).
Two items examined how participants perceive the continuity of emergency (perceived
continuity of emergency; e.g., ‘The Syrian refugee issue has gone for a long time.’;
rBritish = .52, rGerman = .38, p < .001). Two items assessed the degree to which
participants see victims as similar to themselves (i.e., perceived similarity; e.g., ‘Syrian
refugees are people likeme.’; rBritish = .80, rGerman = .71, p < .001). Two itemsmeasured
Figure 2. Standardized regression weights for the SEM with the factors of the global bystander
intervention model in Study 2 and Study 3. ***p < .001. **p < .01.
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how much participants identify effective ways of helping victims. (identifying effective
ways of helping; e.g., ‘I know the help I would give Syrian refugees would fully reach
them.’; rBritish = .61, rGerman = .60, p < .001). Two items assessed the degree to which
participants think theywould be negatively evaluated by those around them in the case of
helping (audience inhibition; e.g., ‘I would feel embarrassed if people around mewould
find out that I’m helping Syrian refugees.’; rBritish = .75, rGerman = .56, p < .001). Two
itemsmeasured howmuch participants consider themselves incapable of helping victims
(incompetency of helping; e.g., ‘I don’t have enough power to help Syrian refugees.’;
rBritish = .48, rGerman = .41, p < .001).
4
We used the same items from Study 2 to assess the four factors of the global bystander
intervention model (NOTICE, EMERGENCY, RESPONSIBILITY, KNOW) while this time,
we employed three different measures to assess its fifth factor (ACT). Political support
was examined with four items that measured the extent to which participants support or
oppose British/German government’s policies that aim to support Syrian refugees (e.g.,
‘The British/German government should grant humanitarian protection to Syrian refugees
through normal asylum procedures.’; 1: strongly oppose, 7: strongly support; αBritish =
.89, αGerman = .71).Helping intentionwas examinedwith three items that measured the
degree to which participants want to help Syrian refugees in different places (e.g., ‘I
would like to help Syrian refugees worldwide.’; αBritish = .94, αGerman = .89). Before
finishing the survey, we provided participants with an optional task to assess charitable
donationmade for victims. We asked participants to convert some of the newswe found
about victims into a machine-readable format by typing out the sentences in given
pictures. Theywere informed that this was needed for another research study and thatwe
will donate £0.02 for each sentence they typed. In the end, we calculated the number of
sentences for each participant (1: £0.02, 15: £0.30) but responses of those who did not
understand the task or did not believe the reality of it were not considered (NBritish = 9,
NGerman = 15). Participants were debriefed and fully their participation reward upon the
completion of the study.
Results
CFA of the model and correlations among model factors
At first, we ran a CFA with the four factors of the global bystander intervention model,
separately for British andGerman samples to test whether the proposed four-factormodel
fits the empirical data from each group. The same items were used as before and
exploratory data analysis revealed deviations from normality in data distributions (Tables
A5 and A6 in Appendix). Therefore, we again used maximum likelihood estimation with
test statistics using 1,000 bootstrapped samples and robust standard errors. Results
showed acceptable model fit for the British sample (χ2 (48) = 157.73, p < .001;
CFI = .94; TLI = .92; RMSEA = .09; SRMR = .06) as well as the German sample (χ2
(48) = 143.38, p < .001; CFI = .95; TLI = .93; RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .07), indicating
that the four-factormodel of global bystander interventionwas supported in both groups.
Then, we ran a series ofmultigroup CFAs to cross-validate the four-factor model across
the two samples and used measurement invariance tests to determine whether the two
groups differ from each other based on structure (configural invariance), factor loadings
4Diffusion of responsibility and self-other overlap were also measured for exploratory reasons but not included in any of the
analyses in this research.
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(metric invariance), intercepts (scalar invariance), and residuals (residual invariance)
(Table A7 in Appendix).
Model 1 with all freely estimated parameters tested for configural invariance to
examine whether the proposed structure would be equal across the two groups. The
model fitwas good, indicating that the factorial structure of the constructwas equal across
groups. The factor pattern coefficientswere then constrained to be equal to test formetric
invariance in Model 2. Results again showed a good fit, indicating the viability of
constraining the factor loadings to be the same across groups.Model 3with equal loadings
and intercepts for testing scalar invariance also fitted the data well, indicating that the
latent means can be meaningfully compared across groups. Finally, Model 4 with equal
loadings, intercepts, and residuals for testing residual invariance had a good fit, indicating
that the observed variables are invariant across groups, having no measurement bias.
The overall goodness-of-fit indices and the tests of differences in fit between adjacent
models supported measurement invariance of the four-factor model across the two
groups. As expected, all indicators showed significantly positive factor loadings, with
standardized coefficients ranging from .54 to .88 for British sample and from .43 to .93 for
German sample (see Table 2 for all factor loadings; Figure A2 in Appendix).
Subsequently, to examine whether all of the items constitute one factor rather than
four, the twelve items were grouped as if predicted by one latent variable, which had a
significantly worse fit to the data than the original model (χ2 (12) = 1128.30, p < .001).
Similarly, to examine whether NOTICE and EMERGENCY items constitute one factor
rather than two as these two factors are highly related based on initial CFA results
(r = .83), their six items were grouped as if predicted by one latent variable. This model
also had a significantly worse fit to the data than the original model (χ2 (6) = 121.08,
p < .001). Taken together, these results were consistent with the characterization of the
bystander intervention model.
Finally, we calculatedmeans and standard deviations, run correlations with computed
mean scores, and checked for reliabilities (see Table 3). Internal consistency coefficients
for all of the four factors were above .70 for British sample and above .72 for German
sample. There were also significant and positive correlations among four latent factors
ranging from .35 (between EMERGENCY and KNOW) to .64 (between NOTICE and
EMERGENCY) for British sample and from .30 (between EMERGENCY and KNOW) to .64
(betweenNOTICE andEMERGENCY) forGerman sample. These results indicate that both
inBritish andGerman samples, thosewhonoticed the eventweremore likely to recognize
it as an emergency, take responsibility to help, and know how to help. Finally, both
political support and helping intention significantly and positively correlated with all of
the factors in both samples. However, charitable donation as the fifth factor did not have a
significant relationship with KNOW in neither sample, while being positively related to
the other three factors in both samples.
SEM of the model
We ran a series of multigroup SEMs for each of the ACT measures to determine whether
the global bystander intervention model works similarly across the two groups. All three
models provided a good fit to the data (political support: χ2 (112) = 344.11, p < .001;
CFI = .95; TLI = .93; RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .06; helping intention: χ2 (112) = 319.77,
p < .001; CFI = .95; TLI = .94; RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .06; charitable donation: χ2
(112) = 293.30, p < .001; CFI = .95; TLI = .93; RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .06). In all
models, each step significantly and positively predicted the subsequent step as theorized
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in the bystander interventionmodel, except thatKNOW did not predict political support,
helping intention, or charitable donation (see Figure 2).
Antecedents of the model factors and differences across samples
We ran multiple linear regressions to test the hypotheses we formulated about the
potential antecedents of each model factor and a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) with all variables as the dependent variables and participant groups as the
independent variable to see the between-group differences. MANOVA results showed
that two groups scored significantly different fromeach other (F (14, 562) = 19.15,Wilk’s
Λ = .68, p < .001). Regression results are presented in Table 4, together with the means,
standard errors, and confidence intervals for each group.
NOTICE. As expected, the salience of victims was positively related to how much both
samples noticed the situation of Syrian refugees (H1). However, compared to British
people, salience of victims was more frequent for German people (F (1, 599) = 114.90,
η2p = .16, p < .001) and they noticed the situation of Syrian refugees more than British
people (F (1, 599) = 9.74, η2p = .02, p = .002).
EMERGENCY. Although pluralistic ignorance was stronger among British people
compared to German people (F (1, 599) = 31.81, η2p = .05, p < .001), it was negatively
related to the recognition of emergency among both samples, as predicted (H2a). While
British people perceived the continuity of emergency significantly higher than German
people (F (1, 599) = 5.88, η2p = .01, p = .016), perceived continuity of emergency was
positively associatedwith the recognition of emergency among both samples, contrary to
our expectation (H2b). Overall, there was not a significant difference between British and
German people in terms of howmuch they recognized the situation of Syrian refugees as
an emergency (F (1, 599) = .24, η2p = .00, p = .624).
RESPONSIBILITY. There was no significant difference between British and German
samples based on how similar they perceived Syrian refugees to themselves (F (1,
599) = 2.84, η2p = .00, p = .093) and how much responsible they felt to help (F (1,
599) = 1.66, η2p = .00, p = .198). In line with our expectation, perceived similarity
positively related to the responsibility to help, for both samples (H3).
KNOW. German people identified effective ways of helping (F (1, 599) = 29.66,
η2p = .05, p < .001) and knew how to help (F (1, 599) = 37.55, η
2
p = .06, p < .001),
significantly more than British people. Eventually, however, identifying effective ways
helpingwas positively related to howmuch both British andGermanpeople knewhow to
help, as expected (H4).
ACT. Audience inhibition levels were similar across two samples (F (1, 599) = 1.59,
η2p = .00, p = .208). In linewithwhat is expected, it negatively related to political support
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and helping intention in both samples, and also negatively related to charitable donation
for British people only (H5a). There was not a difference between British and German
people in terms of how incompetent they feel to help (F (1, 599) = .05, η2p = .00,
p = .827). Contrary to our prediction, this feeling of incompetency in helping did not
correlate with political support or charitable donation in either sample while positively
correlating with helping intention in both samples (H5b). Consequently, even though
both samples reported similar levels of intention to help (F (1, 599) = 2.62, η2p = .00,
p = .106), German people showed more political support (F (1, 599) = 6.89, η2p = .01,
p = .009) and donated more money (F (1, 575) = 25.89, η2p = .04, p < .001) than British
people.
DISCUSSION
Across three studies, we provide the first empirical evidence for the applicability of the
bystander intervention model to global emergencies, in which individuals indirectly
witness a disaster and are faced with its secondary consequences. To test these
predictions, we first constructed a scale that displayed reliability and validity across three
studies. Our main results demonstrate that the first four steps of the global bystander
intervention model gradually predict their subsequent steps as in the original model
(Latane & Darley, 1970). Surprisingly, however, the fifth step of the model (ACT) is not
predicted by its preceding step (KNOW). Therefore, we conclude that people respond to
a global emergency in similar ways that they do to other emergencies of which they are
first-hand bystanders. However, knowing how to helpmay not always predict actual help
in global emergencies, which indicates a major difference between bystander interven-
tion and global bystander intervention.
This rather contradictory result may be due to the continuous nature of global
emergencies. Most global emergencies require long-term assistance for sustainable
solutions, as opposed to the other first-hand emergencies (e.g., a traffic accident, fire,
flood) that can be solved relatively quickly. Thus, it is possible that people delay their
helping responses to global emergencies, perhaps to discover the best possible way or
time of helping. This is an important issue to explore for future research. Moreover, the
possible interference of individual preferences cannot be ruled out as there are many
ongoing global emergencies that require urgent humanitarian action concurrently. Since
people have limited capacities to help, they may develop preferences to prioritize a
specific global situation over others (or perhaps, local situations over global issues) and
direct their assistance to a certain cause. In future investigations, it might be beneficial to
use an extra measure in which it is possible to simultaneously assess how people respond
to different global emergencies to understand whether supporting a global cause would
cap their helping responses to other global issues.
Findings from the cross-country comparisons disclose that the global bystander
intervention model successfully works in two different contexts; one where the after-
effects of the global emergency are less observable (e.g., UK in Study 3) and onewhere the
repercussions of it are more evident (e.g., Germany in Study 3). Yet, there are still some
differences between the two contexts vis-à-vis the steps of the model. When the global
emergency after-effects are more apparent in the context, victims are likely to be more
frequently salient and people are more likely to notice the situation (i.e., the first step;
NOTICE). Likewise, people in such contexts are more likely to identify effective ways of
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helping and knowhow tohelp (i.e., the fourth step;KNOW), and also,more likely to show
political support and donate money (i.e., the fifth step; ACT).
We compared two contexts based on the antecedents of the global bystander
interventionmodel factors.Althoughmostof theresults are in theexpecteddirection, there
also appear some surprising findings. People in both samples recognize the emergency
morewhen the perceived continuity of emergency increase (rather than decrease), which
maysuggest thatan increasedperceptionofcontinuitymayhint theseverityof thesituation,
instead of its chronicity as we suggested. Moreover, those who think their help would be
seen negatively by those around them donate less money, but only in the contextwith less
visible aftermaths of the global emergency. Therefore, perhaps witnessing the emergency
aftermathsmakespeople less influencedbyothers’negative thoughtsof themselves,which
canbe testedby future research. Finally, inbothsamples, themorepeople feel incompetent
to help, the less they intend to help while their political support and charitable donation
levels remain irrelevant to this feeling of incompetency. This difference rises an important
questionto investigatewhatpeopleperceiveashelping inglobalemergenciesandwhythey
feel incompetent to help in that way.
Theoretical implications
This research is the first to empirically test the bystander intervention model in a global
setting and it extends and validates its effectiveness in a discrete setting for the first time.
By doing so, our results build on the fundamental work of Latane and Darley (1970) who
introduced the bystander intervention model in a laboratory setting and of Pittinsky and
Diamente (2015) who later developed a theoretical framework for the application of this
model into global emergencies. Additionally, our research responds to the call for testing
differences between various forms of intergroup prosociality (Louis et al., 2019), by
comparing three different forms of helping in the global bystander intervention model.
Our findings also support several lines of the current literature. The results showing
that higher levels of political support and charitable donation in the context with more
aftermath effects are in line with the research reporting that actual or hypothetical
physical proximity to the disaster zone increases disaster giving (Zagefka, 2017). In effect,
this research goes beyond the existing findings by signifying a potential effect of physical
proximity on helping, even when this proximity is to the disaster repercussions, rather
than the disaster itself. Furthermore, we show that despite differences in political support
and charitable donation, helping intention levels are similar between two contexts.
In addition, the difference between two samples based on political support and
charitable donation, but not based on helping intention, further supports the intention–-
behaviour gap (Sheeran & Webb, 2016), by demonstrating that not every helping
intention turns into a helping action in global emergencies. A potential explanation for
this may derive from the significant difference between two samples based on contextual
differences and knowing how to help.Our findings show that those from the contextwith
less visible aftermath know how to provide help, less than those from the context with
more visible aftermath.
Although KNOW does not significantly connect to any of the ACT measures in the
models we tested, the significant correlations between themmay point out an interesting
venue for future research to explore. This discrepancy could be attributed to a lack of
prioritizing global emergencies in actual behaviour as they seem physically and psycho-
logically furtheraway(Trope&Liberman,2010).Furtherstudies,which take thispossibility
into account, will need to be undertaken. Overall, however, making information about
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effectivelyhelping thevictimsof global disastersmoreconcrete and readily available canbe
a beneficial strategy to promote individual support from distant countries.
Another contribution of this research is highlighting the negative connection between
incompetency of helping and helping intention, which again signals that people want to
help but they do not feel capable of doing so. Even though this relationship can be
somewhat instrumental in explaining the intention–behaviour gap, examining some
other factors that can feed into this connection might be more useful. For instance, the
political and media discourses about the victims of a global emergency may play a role in
shaping individual responses (Goodman & Kirkwood, 2019), which then could affect the
feelings of competency to help. Likewise, the cause of the global disaster (i.e., humanly
caused versus naturally caused) can signpost victims’ efforts to help themselves (Zagefka
et al., 2011) and this may influence how much potential helpers feel competent or
incompetent to help.
Limitations and future directions
Our research targets a very specific emergency about refugees. Future research, therefore,
should refocus the items of our global bystander intervention scale by changing its target
sample/situation to establish its viability. For example, in all items, the ‘Syrian refugee
issue’ could be turned into ‘global water scarcity’ and ‘Syrian refugees’ could be turned
into ‘people without access to clean water’. Only the second item, however, requires a
major change for a different context, in which ‘I know that a lot of Syrians are forced to
leave their country each year to be able to continue their lives.’ can be adapted to the
specific situation under study (e.g., ‘I know that a lot of people do not have access to clean
water to be able to continue their lives.’).
Similarly, we explore some antecedents that we are interested in and identify how
these antecedents and their relationships to the model factors show similarities or
differences across two settings. Further studies using experimental designs are required to
detect any causal relationships, to specify the nature and direction of any potential effects,
and to test the applicability of these potential effects across different emergencies.
Another limitation is including helping intention to assess the fifth step of the global
bystander intervention model (ACT). Helping intention is not really an action; however,
we consider it a proxy measure of helping. Since it is not possible to embrace every
possible way of helping in global emergencies, it gives key indications about people’s
general attitudes (such as the positive correlation between helping intention and feeling
incompetent to help in Study 3). Building on this, there is abundant room for further
progress in investigating what kind of helping behaviours people perform in response to
what kind of global emergencies.
Moreover, the sample size in Study 2 is relatively small for a CFA; however, strong factor
loadings in our results suggest that it is enough to produce stable parameters (Wolf et al.,
2013). Finally, a weakness in our cross-country design is collecting data from German
people with an English survey. Although Germany is one of the top countries in which
citizens speak English competently (English Proficiency Index, 2020), thisweakness could
harm the robustness of our results. Future research within different contexts using the
native language of potential helpers could provide more definitive evidence.
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Conclusion
Our research has gone someways towards enhancing our understanding of the bystander
intervention model in a global context and it lays the empirical groundwork for future
research into its application to other global settings. Individuals may act in the same way
when they are responding to global emergencies; however, they are less likely to notice
these emergencies and know how to help if emergency aftermaths are less visible.
Therefore, considering the specific contexts in which potential helpers reside, together
with the role of other individuals in that context, is essential. Since the majority of the
global emergencies happen in poorer areas of the world or at least affect the poorest the
most (World Health Organization, 2020), these findings are considered valuable in order
to understand how to raise support of those in geographically and psychologically distant
andmostlywealthier parts of theworld,whose even small acts of help can be instrumental
in rebuilding the lives of many.
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Appendix :
Figure A2. Standardized regression weights for the CFA with the four factors of the global bystander
intervention model in Study 3. ***p < .001.
Figure A1. Standardized regression weights for the CFA with the four factors of the global bystander
intervention model in Study 2. ***p < .001. **p < .01.
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Table A1. Factor definitions with the item statements created for the four latent factors of the global
bystander intervention model in Study 1
Noticing the event: Shifting attention to an atypical situation and becoming aware of an unusual event
Item 1a I am aware of the Syrian refugee issue around the world.
Item 2 I know that my country has taken on a number of Syrian refugees.
Item 3a I know that a lot of Syrians are forced to leave their country each year to be able to
continue their lives.
Item 4 I am aware of Syrians who die every day while escaping their countries to save their lives.
Item 17a I am aware that there is a war in Syria causing many people to flee from their homeland.
Item 18 I know that millions of Syrians flee from their country and seek shelter in other countries.
Item 19 I know that Syrian refugees are undergoing a horrible pain to save their lives.
Item 20 I am aware that Syrian refugees flee to safety and stability from conflict and violence.
Recognizing the event as an emergency: Acknowledging the urgency of an event and identifying it
as an emergency that requires others’ assistance
Item 5 I believe that people urgently need to intervene in the Syrian refugee issue by offering some
kind of help or support.
Item 6 I think that it is crucial for Syrian refugees to receive help from other people.
Item 7 I believe that the assistance of other people is fundamental to cease the suffering of
Syrian refugees.
Item 8a It is evident to me that urgent humanitarian aid is needed for the Syrian refugee issue.
Item 21a I think that the Syrian refugee issue is a severe emergency that other people
should be involved.
Item 22 It is evident to me that someone who is a Syrian refugee needs help from others.
Item 23a I believe that the situation of Syrian refugees is an emergency that requires the
help of other people.
Item 24 I think that a lot of immediate funding is needed to save the lives of Syrian refugees.
Taking responsibility to help: Having care for those in need and feeling responsible to support them
Item 9a I feel personally responsible for helping Syrian refugees to safely continue their lives.
Item 10 I feel responsible for taking action to resolve the current situation of Syrian refugees.
Item 11 It is my responsibility to intervene in the suffering of Syrian refugees I witnessed.
Item 12a It is my duty to do something to ease the pain and suffering of Syrian refugees.
Item 25 Although I’m not the one causing Syrian refugees’ situation, it is still my
responsibility
as a human to try to help them.
Item 26a I believe that I have a responsibility to help Syrian refugees because my actions
can comfort them.
Item 27 I feel it is my duty to help Syrian refugees because I’m better off than they are.
Item 28 I believe that I have a responsibility to do what I can to help Syrian refugees.
Knowing how to help: Having information about or capacity to learn about how to provide help to
those in need
Item 13 I have the skills to support a Syrian refugee who needs assistance.
Item 14a I know what to say to get others to help or support Syrian refugees.
Continued
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Table A1. (Continued)
Knowing how to help: Having information about or capacity to learn about how to provide help to
those in need
Item 15 I can help with getting a Syrian refugee out of a situation in which they are suffering.
Item 16a I can find organizations that provide support to Syrian refugees.
Item 29 I can easily reach out the charities that help Syrian refugees.
Item 30 I feel capable of helping Syrian refugees by raising my voice about their struggles.
Item 31a I know a number of ways I can help Syrian refugees.
Item 32 I am capable of using my political voice in favour of Syrian refugees to support their struggles.
aItems that were identified to best represent their intended constructs, providing a 3-item solution for
each of the four factors.
Table A2. Proportion of substantive agreement (Psa) and substantive-validity indices (Csv) by items and
factors in Study 1
Factors
Assignment frequencies for NOTICE items
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 17 Item 18 Item 19 Item 20
NOTICE 71 11 64 49 68 58 42 53
EMERGENCY 5 46 11 30 10 18 33 21
RESPONSIBILITY 0 7 0 0 0 1 1 1
KNOW 4 9 1 1 2 1 2 1
Unclassified 0 7 4 0 0 2 2 4
Psa .888 .575 .800 .613 .850 .725 .525 .663
Csv .825 .438 .663 .238 .725 .500 .113 .400
Factors
Assignment frequencies for EMERGENCY items
Item 5 Item 6 Item 7 Item 8 Item 21 Item 22 Item 23 Item 24
NOTICE 5 10 14 11 4 25 5 8
EMERGENCY 45 34 26 56 67 29 62 40
RESPONSIBILITY 18 22 18 5 5 14 10 2
KNOW 11 9 17 8 3 6 2 28
Unclassified 1 5 5 0 1 6 0 2
Psa .563 .425 .325 .700 .838 .363 .775 .500
Csv .338 .150 .100 .563 .775 .050 .650 .150
Factors
Assignment frequencies for RESPONSIBILITY items
Item 9 Item 10 Item 11 Item 12 Item 25 Item 26 Item 27 Item 28
NOTICE 2 4 2 4 6 3 4 5
EMERGENCY 1 6 8 3 6 2 3 3
RESPONSIBILITY 67 65 64 66 63 66 59 65
KNOW 2 3 5 5 3 6 9 6
Continued
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Table A3. Skewness, kurtosis, and normality scores for the items of the global bystander intervention




M SD z z W
NOTICE 1 5.21 1.40 −1.08 1.03 0.87***
NOTICE 2 5.41 1.41 −1.28 1.57 0.84***
NOTICE 3 5.95 1.31 −1.82 3.70 0.75***
EMERGENCY 1 5.40 1.60 −1.32 1.29 0.81***
EMERGENCY 2 5.20 1.54 −1.09 0.84 0.86***
EMERGENCY 3 5.50 1.46 −1.42 2.09 0.82***
RESPONSIBILITY 1 3.28 1.60 0.26 −0.74 0.93***
RESPONSIBILITY 2 3.85 1.60 −0.23 −0.58 0.93***
RESPONSIBILITY 3 3.75 1.56 −0.11 −0.62 0.94***
KNOW1 2.94 1.46 0.61 −0.25 0.91***
KNOW2 4.48 1.56 −0.46 −0.42 0.93***
KNOW3 3.06 1.57 0.46 −0.65 0.92***




Assignment frequencies for RESPONSIBILITY items
Item 9 Item 10 Item 11 Item 12 Item 25 Item 26 Item 27 Item 28
Unclassified 8 2 1 2 2 3 5 1
Psa .838 .813 .800 .825 .788 .825 .738 .813
Csv .738 .738 .700 .763 .713 .750 .625 .738
Factors
Assignment frequencies for KNOW items
Item 13 Item 14 Item 15 Item 16 Item 29 Item 30 Item 31 Item 32
NOTICE 0 4 3 2 2 2 6 2
EMERGENCY 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 5
RESPONSIBILITY 21 13 23 10 15 24 6 17
KNOW 49 59 51 65 57 51 64 52
Unclassified 7 2 2 2 4 2 3 4
Psa .613 .738 .678 .813 .713 .678 .800 .650
Csv .350 .575 .350 .688 .525 .338 .725 .438
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NOTICE 1 .03 .03 .06 .09 .30 .34 .15
NOTICE 2 .03 .03 .01 .13 .20 .39 .20
NOTICE 3 .02 .02 .01 .04 .17 .33 .41
EMERGENCY 1 .05 .04 .02 .05 .28 .29 .27
EMERGENCY 2 .05 .03 .04 .13 .24 .32 .19
EMERGENCY 3 .04 .02 .01 .09 .24 .33 .26
RESPONSIBILITY 1 .16 .20 .19 .21 .16 .05 .03
RESPONSIBILITY 2 .11 .11 .14 .28 .25 .08 .04
RESPONSIBILITY 3 .11 .13 .14 .29 .21 .07 .04
KNOW1 .16 .30 .20 .18 .11 .03 .02
KNOW2 .05 .07 .11 .22 .25 .20 .08
KNOW3 .18 .22 .25 .12 .16 .05 .02
Table A5. Skewness, kurtosis, and normality scores for the items of the global bystander intervention




M SD z z W
NOTICE 1 5.29 1.27 −1.01 1.07 .88***
NOTICE 2 5.61 1.30 −1.38 2.13 .83***
NOTICE 3 6.04 1.02 −1.65 4.48 .78***
EMERGENCY 1 5.44 1.33 −1.02 1.07 .88***
EMERGENCY 2 5.12 1.36 −0.84 0.82 .90***
EMERGENCY 3 5.44 1.27 −1.11 1.51 .87***
RESPONSIBILITY 1 3.06 1.48 0.40 −0.51 .93***
RESPONSIBILITY 2 3.63 1.52 −0.06 −0.64 .94***
RESPONSIBILITY 3 3.71 1.49 −0.14 −0.59 .94***
KNOW1 3.00 1.28 0.37 −0.49 .93***
KNOW2 4.65 1.48 −0.50 −0.31 .93***
KNOW3 3.45 1.47 0.17 −0.80 .94***
Note. Royston’s H = 990.92, p < .001.
***p < .001.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NOTICE 1 .01 .02 .07 .09 .30 .36 .14
NOTICE 2 .02 .03 .03 .06 .23 .39 .24
NOTICE 3 .01 .01 .01 .03 .17 .40 .37
EMERGENCY 1 .02 .03 .04 .11 .26 .33 .22
EMERGENCY 2 .03 .03 .05 .16 .32 .26 .15
EMERGENCY 3 .02 .02 .04 .10 .27 .37 .19
RESPONSIBILITY 1 .17 .23 .22 .21 .11 .04 .02
RESPONSIBILITY 2 .11 .15 .15 .31 .18 .07 .03
RESPONSIBILITY 3 .10 .13 .17 .29 .22 .07 .02
KNOW1 .11 .29 .27 .20 .11 .03 .00
KNOW2 .03 .08 .10 .19 .29 .22 .09
KNOW3 .09 .21 .25 .17 .20 .07 .01
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